HMAC and Data Integrity: Detecting Tampering with Shared Secrets

Published: Sat Feb 01 2025 | Modified: Wed Feb 18 2026 , 15 minutes reading.

1. Why Should You Care?

You’re building an API. Clients send requests like:

{"action": "transfer", "amount": 1000, "to": "attacker"}

How do you know this request wasn’t modified in transit? How do you know it came from an authorized client?

If you already share a secret key with the client (like an API key), you can use a Message Authentication Code (MAC) to verify both authenticity and integrity—faster than digital signatures.

2. Definition

A Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a short piece of information used to authenticate a message and verify its integrity.

HMAC (Hash-based MAC) constructs a MAC using a cryptographic hash function and a secret key.

MAC Properties:
- Anyone with the key can generate
- Anyone with the key can verify
- Without the key, cannot forge

Digital Signature vs MAC:
- Signature: Only signer can create, anyone can verify
- MAC: Anyone with key can create AND verify
- Signature: Non-repudiation
- MAC: No non-repudiation (both parties can create)

3. Why Not Just Hash?

The Naive Approach (Broken)

# WRONG: Simple hash is not authentication
import hashlib

def naive_integrity(message):
    return hashlib.sha256(message).hexdigest()

# Attacker can compute hash of any message!
# This provides NO authentication

The Problem

Hash alone proves:
✗ Nothing about who created the message
✗ Nothing about authorization

Because:
- Hash functions are public
- Anyone can compute SHA256(any_message)
- Attacker can forge: message' + SHA256(message')

Why HMAC Works

HMAC includes a secret key:
HMAC(key, message) = hash(key || hash(key || message))

Only those who know the key can:
- Compute valid MACs
- Verify MACs

Without the key, attacker cannot:
- Compute MAC for modified message
- Find a different message with same MAC

4. HMAC Construction

The HMAC Formula

HMAC(K, m) = H((K' ⊕ opad) || H((K' ⊕ ipad) || m))

Where:
K  = secret key
K' = key padded to block size
H  = hash function (SHA-256, etc.)
⊕  = XOR
opad = outer padding (0x5c repeated)
ipad = inner padding (0x36 repeated)
m  = message

Why This Structure?

Simple approaches have flaws:

H(key || message):      Length extension attacks
H(message || key):      Collision issues
H(key || message || key): Still vulnerable

HMAC's nested structure:
- Prevents length extension
- Provides security proof
- Standard since RFC 2104 (1997)

5. Using HMAC in Python

Basic HMAC

import hmac
import hashlib

key = b"super-secret-api-key"
message = b"action=transfer&amount=1000&to=alice"

# Compute HMAC
mac = hmac.new(key, message, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
print(f"HMAC: {mac}")

# Verify HMAC (timing-safe comparison)
def verify_hmac(key, message, received_mac):
    expected_mac = hmac.new(key, message, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
    return hmac.compare_digest(expected_mac, received_mac)

# Usage
is_valid = verify_hmac(key, message, mac)
print(f"Valid: {is_valid}")

Common Mistake: Timing Attacks

# WRONG: Vulnerable to timing attack
def insecure_verify(expected, received):
    return expected == received  # Leaks length info!

# RIGHT: Constant-time comparison
import hmac
def secure_verify(expected, received):
    return hmac.compare_digest(expected, received)

# Why timing matters:
# == operator returns early on first mismatch
# Attacker can measure time to guess MAC byte by byte
# compare_digest always takes same time

6. Real-World Applications

API Request Signing

import hmac
import hashlib
import time
import base64

class APIClient:
    def __init__(self, api_key: str, api_secret: str):
        self.api_key = api_key
        self.api_secret = api_secret.encode()

    def sign_request(self, method: str, path: str, body: str = "") -> dict:
        timestamp = str(int(time.time()))

        # Create string to sign
        string_to_sign = f"{method}\n{path}\n{timestamp}\n{body}"

        # Compute HMAC
        signature = hmac.new(
            self.api_secret,
            string_to_sign.encode(),
            hashlib.sha256
        ).hexdigest()

        return {
            "X-API-Key": self.api_key,
            "X-Timestamp": timestamp,
            "X-Signature": signature
        }

class APIServer:
    def __init__(self, secrets: dict):
        self.secrets = secrets  # api_key -> api_secret

    def verify_request(self, method: str, path: str, body: str,
                       api_key: str, timestamp: str, signature: str) -> bool:
        # Check timestamp (prevent replay attacks)
        if abs(time.time() - int(timestamp)) > 300:  # 5 minute window
            return False

        # Get secret for this key
        api_secret = self.secrets.get(api_key)
        if not api_secret:
            return False

        # Recompute signature
        string_to_sign = f"{method}\n{path}\n{timestamp}\n{body}"
        expected = hmac.new(
            api_secret.encode(),
            string_to_sign.encode(),
            hashlib.sha256
        ).hexdigest()

        return hmac.compare_digest(expected, signature)

import hmac
import hashlib
import base64
import json
import time

class SecureCookie:
    def __init__(self, secret_key: bytes):
        self.secret_key = secret_key

    def create(self, data: dict, max_age: int = 3600) -> str:
        """Create a signed cookie value"""
        payload = {
            "data": data,
            "exp": int(time.time()) + max_age
        }
        payload_json = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True)
        payload_b64 = base64.b64encode(payload_json.encode()).decode()

        # Sign the payload
        signature = hmac.new(
            self.secret_key,
            payload_b64.encode(),
            hashlib.sha256
        ).hexdigest()

        return f"{payload_b64}.{signature}"

    def verify(self, cookie_value: str) -> dict | None:
        """Verify and decode a signed cookie"""
        try:
            payload_b64, signature = cookie_value.rsplit(".", 1)

            # Verify signature
            expected = hmac.new(
                self.secret_key,
                payload_b64.encode(),
                hashlib.sha256
            ).hexdigest()

            if not hmac.compare_digest(expected, signature):
                return None

            # Decode and check expiration
            payload = json.loads(base64.b64decode(payload_b64))

            if time.time() > payload["exp"]:
                return None

            return payload["data"]

        except Exception:
            return None

# Usage
cookie = SecureCookie(b"my-super-secret-key")
value = cookie.create({"user_id": 123, "role": "admin"})
print(f"Cookie: {value}")

data = cookie.verify(value)
print(f"Data: {data}")

Webhook Verification

import hmac
import hashlib

def verify_github_webhook(payload: bytes, signature: str, secret: str) -> bool:
    """Verify GitHub webhook signature"""
    # GitHub sends: sha256=<hex_digest>
    if not signature.startswith("sha256="):
        return False

    expected = "sha256=" + hmac.new(
        secret.encode(),
        payload,
        hashlib.sha256
    ).hexdigest()

    return hmac.compare_digest(expected, signature)

def verify_stripe_webhook(payload: bytes, signature: str, secret: str) -> bool:
    """Verify Stripe webhook signature"""
    # Stripe format: t=timestamp,v1=signature
    parts = dict(p.split("=") for p in signature.split(","))

    # Stripe signs: timestamp.payload
    signed_payload = f"{parts['t']}.{payload.decode()}"

    expected = hmac.new(
        secret.encode(),
        signed_payload.encode(),
        hashlib.sha256
    ).hexdigest()

    return hmac.compare_digest(expected, parts["v1"])

7. HMAC vs Other MACs

Comparison

HMAC:
- Based on hash function (SHA-256, etc.)
- Well-studied, conservative choice
- Slightly slower than some alternatives

Poly1305:
- Designed for speed
- Used with ChaCha20 (ChaCha20-Poly1305)
- One-time key per message

CMAC/OMAC:
- Based on block cipher (AES)
- Used in some standards
- Similar security to HMAC

GMAC:
- MAC part of GCM mode
- Very fast with AES-NI
- Requires unique nonce

When to Use What

Use HMAC-SHA256 when:
- Need standalone MAC
- Maximum compatibility
- Conservative security choice

Use Poly1305 when:
- Using ChaCha20 for encryption
- Need maximum speed
- Part of authenticated encryption

Use GCM/GMAC when:
- Using AES for encryption
- Need authenticated encryption
- Have hardware AES support

8. Security Considerations

Key Management

HMAC key requirements:
- Must be secret (obviously)
- Should be random, not derived from passwords
- Minimum 128 bits, prefer 256 bits
- Different keys for different purposes

Key derivation if needed:
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes

def derive_hmac_key(master_key: bytes, purpose: str) -> bytes:
    return HKDF(
        algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
        length=32,
        salt=None,
        info=purpose.encode()
    ).derive(master_key)

What HMAC Doesn’t Provide

HMAC does NOT provide:
✗ Confidentiality (message is plaintext)
✗ Non-repudiation (both parties can create MAC)
✗ Replay protection (need timestamp/nonce)

For confidentiality + integrity:
→ Use authenticated encryption (AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305)

For non-repudiation:
→ Use digital signatures

For replay protection:
→ Include timestamp or sequence number in message

Common Mistakes

# WRONG: Using password as key
hmac.new(b"password123", message, hashlib.sha256)

# RIGHT: Derive key from password
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.scrypt import Scrypt
kdf = Scrypt(salt=salt, length=32, n=2**20, r=8, p=1)
key = kdf.derive(b"password123")
hmac.new(key, message, hashlib.sha256)

# WRONG: Same key for encryption and MAC
aes_key = os.urandom(32)
encrypted = aes_encrypt(aes_key, plaintext)
mac = hmac.new(aes_key, encrypted, hashlib.sha256)

# RIGHT: Separate keys
aes_key = os.urandom(32)
mac_key = os.urandom(32)
encrypted = aes_encrypt(aes_key, plaintext)
mac = hmac.new(mac_key, encrypted, hashlib.sha256)

# BEST: Use authenticated encryption
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
key = AESGCM.generate_key(bit_length=256)
aesgcm = AESGCM(key)
ciphertext = aesgcm.encrypt(nonce, plaintext, associated_data)

9. HMAC in Protocols

TLS

TLS uses HMAC (or AEAD) for record authentication:

TLS Record:
┌────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Content Type │ Version │ Length │ Payload  │
├────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│              Encrypted + MAC               │
└────────────────────────────────────────────┘

TLS 1.2: MAC-then-encrypt or AEAD
TLS 1.3: AEAD only (GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305)

JWT

JWT structure:
header.payload.signature

For HS256 (HMAC-SHA256):
signature = HMAC-SHA256(
    secret,
    base64url(header) + "." + base64url(payload)
)

Verification:
1. Split token into parts
2. Recompute HMAC
3. Compare signatures (constant-time!)

AWS Signature V4

AWS request signing uses HMAC chains:

DateKey      = HMAC-SHA256("AWS4" + SecretKey, Date)
RegionKey    = HMAC-SHA256(DateKey, Region)
ServiceKey   = HMAC-SHA256(RegionKey, Service)
SigningKey   = HMAC-SHA256(ServiceKey, "aws4_request")
Signature    = HMAC-SHA256(SigningKey, StringToSign)

10. Complete Example: Signed Messages

import hmac
import hashlib
import json
import time
import os
import base64

class SignedMessageProtocol:
    """Complete protocol for authenticated messages"""

    def __init__(self, shared_secret: bytes):
        self.key = shared_secret

    def create_message(self, payload: dict) -> str:
        """Create authenticated message"""
        # Add metadata
        message = {
            "payload": payload,
            "timestamp": int(time.time()),
            "nonce": base64.b64encode(os.urandom(16)).decode()
        }

        # Serialize
        message_json = json.dumps(message, sort_keys=True)
        message_b64 = base64.b64encode(message_json.encode()).decode()

        # Create MAC
        mac = hmac.new(
            self.key,
            message_b64.encode(),
            hashlib.sha256
        ).hexdigest()

        return f"{message_b64}.{mac}"

    def verify_message(self, signed_message: str,
                       max_age: int = 300) -> dict | None:
        """Verify and extract message"""
        try:
            # Split
            message_b64, received_mac = signed_message.rsplit(".", 1)

            # Verify MAC
            expected_mac = hmac.new(
                self.key,
                message_b64.encode(),
                hashlib.sha256
            ).hexdigest()

            if not hmac.compare_digest(expected_mac, received_mac):
                return None

            # Decode
            message_json = base64.b64decode(message_b64)
            message = json.loads(message_json)

            # Check timestamp
            age = time.time() - message["timestamp"]
            if age < 0 or age > max_age:
                return None

            return message["payload"]

        except Exception:
            return None

# Usage
secret = os.urandom(32)
protocol = SignedMessageProtocol(secret)

# Sender
msg = protocol.create_message({
    "action": "transfer",
    "amount": 100,
    "to": "alice@example.com"
})
print(f"Signed message: {msg[:50]}...")

# Receiver
payload = protocol.verify_message(msg)
if payload:
    print(f"Verified payload: {payload}")
else:
    print("Verification failed!")

11. Summary

Three things to remember:

HMAC provides authentication AND integrity. Unlike plain hashing, HMAC requires knowledge of the secret key. Without the key, attackers cannot forge valid MACs.
Always use constant-time comparison. Use hmac.compare_digest() to prevent timing attacks. Regular string comparison leaks information through timing.
HMAC doesn’t replace encryption. It verifies integrity but doesn’t hide content. For confidentiality + integrity, use authenticated encryption (AES-GCM).

12. What’s Next

We’ve now covered the fundamental cryptographic primitives: symmetric encryption, asymmetric encryption, digital signatures, certificates, and MACs.

In the next section, we’ll see how these pieces come together in real protocols: TLS Deep Dive—how HTTPS actually works, from handshake to secure data transfer.

Luke Sun